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Abstract—Binary instrumentation and rewriting frameworks
provide a powerful way of implementing custom analysis and
transformation techniques for applications ranging from per-
formance profiling to security monitoring. However, using these
frameworks to write even simple analyses and transformations
is non-trivial. Developers often need to write framework-specific
boilerplate code and work with low-level and complex program-
ming details. This not only results in hundreds (or thousands) of
lines of code, but also leaves significant room for error.
To address this, we introduce Cinnamon, a domain-specific
language designed to write programs for binary profiling and
monitoring. Cinnamon’s abstractions allow the programmer to
focus on implementing their technique in a platform-independent
way, without worrying about complex lower-level details. Prog-
rammers can use these abstractions to perform analysis and
instrumentation at different locations and granularity levels
in the binary. The flexibility of Cinnamon also enables its
programs to be mapped to static, dynamic or hybrid analysis
and instrumentation approaches. As a proof of concept, we target
Cinnamon to three different binary frameworks by implementing
a custom Cinnamon to C/C++ compiler and integrating the
generated code within these frameworks. We further demonstrate
the ability of Cinnamon to express a range of profiling and
monitoring tools through different use-cases.
Index Terms—Domain-Specific language, Profiling, Binary ana-
lysis and instrumentation
I. INTRODUCTION
Profiling and monitoring tools that work directly with
application binaries are valuable aids for understanding and
characterizing program execution, as well as for detecting bugs
and ensuring they run safely. They are especially important
when application source code is unavailable, recompilation
is infeasible, or it uses third-party applications and external
libraries [1]. However, writing these tools from scratch is a
challenging and tedious task and generally involves a process of
disassembly or lifting the binary to a higher-level representation
that is easier to work with. Programmers then also need to write
code to recover control-flow information, such as basic blocks
and functions, which adds to the development challenge [2].
To address this, a range of tools have been developed that
can lift a binary to assembly [3], [4], LLVM’s intermediate
representation (IR) [5] or a custom IR [6]–[8]. There are also
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a number binary analysis and instrumentation frameworks [9]–
[15], that provide infrastructure support to write custom
profiling and monitoring tools. However, developing such tools
is a non-trivial task, even for simple profiling and monitoring
schemes, due to the complexity of these frameworks and
different programming interfaces. Developers not only need to
add boilerplate code to implement their algorithms within these
frameworks, but may also need to write complex low-level
code to perform even simple accesses or modifications to the
binary, such as finding the address loaded from or stored to by
a memory instruction [9]. This adds significantly to the length
and complexity of the code and increases the chance of bugs
creeping into the final tool.
On the other hand, were these tools to be more accessible
to developers then they would be able to perform sophisticated
analysis and profiling of all manner of applications. Providing
developers with a simple interface to the underlying frameworks
would avoid them having to write low-level and repetitive
code, allowing them to focus solely on the correctness of
their analysis and monitoring techniques. This would unleash
a new era of binary instrumentation, with renewed interest in
developing schemes that operate at the binary level, independent
of any particular compiler framework, which is becoming
increasingly important as more code gets dynamically generated
by a JIT and developers have a wider choice of source
languages to write in.
In order to overcome these challenges, we propose a domain-
specific language (DSL), Cinnamon, to write programs for
binary profiling and monitoring. Cinnamon raises the abstrac-
tion level for developers, providing a natural programming
model in which to write analysis and instrumentation code
more efficiently and in a framework- and platform-independent
way. The major contributions of this work include:
• the design and implementation of Cinnamon, a DSL
and compiler tool-chain for writing binary profiling and
monitoring programs;
• higher-level control-flow, data and type abstractions to
facilitate efficient implementation of different profiling
and monitoring techniques;
• a programming model and abstractions to facilitate map-
ping of Cinnamon programs to static, dynamic or hybrid
binary instrumentation frameworks;
• a set of case studies demonstrating the applicability
and flexibility of Cinnamon to express different binary
profiling and monitoring techniques from the literature;
• an open-source implementation of Cinnamon1.
II. BACKGROUND
The ability to perform analysis and instrumentation directly
on program binaries has many powerful applications, from
profiling to security monitoring. Code-coverage profilers [14],
[16] and performance analyzers [17] help in identifying
program hotspots with the potential for optimization. Security
monitoring tools can analyze a binary to find malware signa-
tures [18], [19] or add instrumentation to monitor its execution,
so as to detect or prevent security attacks [20], [21]. These can
also be used to identify security vulnerabilities [9], [22]–[25]
that can be exploited by malicious attackers. Beyond passive
profiling and monitoring, other techniques actively transform
the binary to optimize performance through the code that is
executed [26]–[28] or its layout in memory [29].
Frameworks for binary instrumentation that facilitate these
applications can operate on the binary statically, dynamically,
or a combination of the two. Each has its pros and cons that
we now explore.
A. Static Binary Frameworks
Static binary frameworks enable binary analysis, instru-
mentation or rewriting without executing the application,
avoiding the run-time cost of performing the analysis or code
modifications [15]. Due to this, complex and time-consuming
analyses can be performed, such as those that explore all
possible execution paths through the program, and be more
complete with higher application code coverage. Recovery of
higher-level structural information also becomes more feasible.
A number of frameworks support the development of custom
binary tools using static approaches [7], [14], [15], [30],
[31] for complex control-flow, data-flow and dependency
analyses [28], [32] and for optimization and security [33]–
[35]. Related frameworks support link-time binary rewriting,
such as Diablo [36] and Alto [37].
However, static binary frameworks can suffer from diffi-
culties in recovering an accurate control-flow graph in the
presence of indirect jumps, which may hamper accurate global
analysis. They are also conservative in their analysis and may
raise false positives [38] due to the lack of precise run-time
information. Furthermore, binaries with dynamic linkage cannot
be analyzed beyond the shared-library call, a similar problem
to that faced by compilers. Finally, it is challenging to verify
that the rewrites made by these static tools are correct.
B. Dynamic Binary Frameworks
Dynamic binary analysis and transformation techniques can
be useful where execution depends on the run-time environment
or critical information is not known statically. For example,
execution may actually only proceed down a small subset of
all control-flow paths and indirect branches. Hence, dynamic
1Cinnamon is available at https://github.com/CompArchCam/Cinnamon.
schemes can limit themselves to the code paths actually seen
during execution, in contrast to static techniques. Dynamic
frameworks are also critical for analyzing programs with
interrupts and calls to shared libraries, which are not present
in the static binary, and detecting dynamically generated or
self-modifying malicious code.
Dynamic binary frameworks enable analyses and trans-
formations to be applied while the code is executing. Val-
grind [9] is a popular dynamic binary instrumentation frame-
work that has facilitated the development of a number of
profiling [39], [40] and vulnerability detection tools [41].
Valgrind disassembles the binary to a custom IR called VEX
and resynthesizes to machine code after adding instrumentation.
Pin [10], DynamoRIO [11], and StarDBT [42] use dynamic
binary translation to add analysis code or perform trans-
formations. Tools built using these frameworks carry out a
variety of functions, such as performance analysis [43], memory
debugging [22], taint checking [44], [45] and protection against
control-flow attacks [21].
Dynamic analysis can be more precise than static approaches
but lacks a global overview of the application and has lower
code coverage. Writing dynamic analysis tools is generally
a complex, tedious and error-prone process and may involve
inserting trampoline calls in the instruction stream to developer-
written analysis routines and ensuring that context is saved
and restored properly. Moreover, the high run-time overhead
of dynamic techniques hinders the development of complex
schemes and limits the usability of these techniques to relatively
simple analyses and transformations [9].
C. Static-Dynamic Hybrid Binary Frameworks
Both static and dynamic approaches have their strengths and
weaknesses. However, these approaches are complementary to
each other and can be combined to build more powerful tools
that can reduce the limitations of each approach when they are
applied separately.
BitBlaze [12] is a binary analysis platform specifically
built for security applications and features components for
static analysis, dynamic analysis and symbolic execution.
Another tool, angr [38], uses static binary analysis and dynamic
symbolic execution to perform different analyses, such as
control-flow recovery and vulnerability detection.
Dyninst [13] offers both static and dynamic binary rewriting
approaches and has been used to build tools for profiling and
performance analysis [46]. Janus [26] is a hybrid static-dynamic
binary modification framework based on DynamoRIO that
combines the power of both static and dynamic approaches to
perform complex analyses and transformations, such as binary
parallelization and vectorization.
Although these frameworks build on the strengths of static
analysis with dynamic rewriting, they also inherit their weak-
nesses too. Developers have to deal with low-level operations
when writing both the static passes that analyze the binary
and the dynamic tools that perform modification. As such,
although they are more powerful frameworks, they can be more



























Figure 1: Overview of a program written in Cinnamon.
binary instrumentation frameworks of all flavors at a higher
level of abstraction, so as to avoid having to deal with low-
level details. The next section presents Cinnamon, our domain-
specific language and compiler to provide this abstraction to
ease the burden of writing instrumentation code.
III. THE CINNAMON LANGUAGE
We designed Cinnamon for building binary analysis and
instrumentation tools for static, dynamic, and hybrid frame-
works. Cinnamon abstracts away details of the target binary
analysis and instrumentation framework and processor ISA,
allowing programmers to focus on the analysis that they wish
to perform, rather than the details of how to go about doing
it. Many programs written in Cinnamon are portable across
target frameworks, regardless of the type of instrumentation
performed or the architecture they target. The Cinnamon
compiler deals with the complexities of mapping the high-level
instrumentation intent, written in Cinnamon, to the specific
implementation required for binary instrumentation within a
given framework.
A. Overview
Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic overview of the core
components of a program written in Cinnamon and its mapping
to different binary frameworks.
A Cinnamon program is made up of a series of command
blocks, each of which operates on a logical control-flow
element (CFE) from the binary, such as an instruction, loop or
function. A command specifies some analysis and actions to
be instrumented at different execution points of a CFE based
on certain constraints.
A command in Cinnamon is mapped by the compiler to a
target backend instrumentation framework. For a purely static
or dynamic framework, a command is mapped in its entirety
to a static or dynamic tool for that framework respectively. If
the target framework is a hybrid design then the analysis and
instrumentation sections of a command can be split between
static and dynamic parts of this underlying framework. The
1 <global variable declarations>
2 /*-------- command 1 starts --------*/
3 inst I <constraint> {
4 <local variable declarations>
5 /* inspection or analysis code */
6 <statements>
7 /* action 1 */
8 before I {
9 <local variable declarations>
10 <statements>
11 }
12 /* action 2 */




17 /*-------- command 1 ends --------*/
Figure 2: High-level pseudo-code of a Cinnamon program for instrumenting
instructions.
block arrows in figure 1 represent the mapping of a Cinnamon
program to three different configurations: A is static only, a
static analyzer with static instrumenter; B is hybrid, a static
analyzer with a dynamic instrumenter; and C is dynamic only, a
dynamic analyzer with a dynamic instrumenter. Compilation of
a Cinnamon program into framework-specific code that realizes
the intended profiling or monitoring technique is discussed in
more detail in section IV.
Figure 2 shows the higher-level structure of a program
in pseudo-code. This example has a single command that
operates on instructions in the binary filtered through the use
of a constraint on the command-block declaration. Inside the
command, two actions are defined, which are to be executed
before and after the instruction executes. User-defined variables
can occur at a global level or within any inner block, and do
not escape out of their defining scope. Analysis code is written
within the command but not within any action.
B. Language Specification
1) Commands: A profiling or monitoring technique is
implemented in Cinnamon using a set of commands. As
described earlier, each command specifies the type of a control-
flow element (CFE) from the under-observation binary, along
with any constraints on its selection, and contains the analysis
and instrumentation code to be run on the instances of the
selected CFE.
2) Control-Flow Abstractions: Recovery of and access to
control-flow structures, such as basic blocks and functions, is
a pre-requisite for any static or dynamic analysis on the binary
and also one of the most challenging tasks. In Cinnamon, we
abstract away the process of control-flow recovery and define
special types that represent the different control-flow elements
available, including modules, functions, loops, basic blocks
and instructions.
A module (module) type represents the highest level of the
control-flow structure of the binary and comprises of all the
functions, loops, basic blocks, and instructions present within
a single binary object. The binary executable is a module
itself, and any shared libraries that it links to are presented
as separate modules. A function (func) is a second-level CFE
that further contains any loops, basic blocks and instructions
that belong to that function. Loops (loop) contain basic blocks
and instructions, and are recognised by building the control-
flow graph of a function, performing dominance analysis,
and identifying back edges. A basic block (basicblock) is a
sequence of instructions where each instruction has only one
predecessor (apart from the first) and only one successor (apart
from the last). Finally, an instruction (inst), is the lowest-level
control-flow element, representing machine instructions from
the target framework’s intermediate representation. A command
can be written to run on any type of element and may contain
further commands that run on lower-level elements within the
scope of the enclosing command.
3) Actions: An action in Cinnamon is the code to be
instrumented at a specified location in the binary. Actions
are expressed as a sequence of C-style statements and can
contain for loops, if-then-else conditionals, function calls,
assignments, and arithmetic and logic statements as well as
I/O operations to standard input/output and files.
4) Trigger Points: We define instrumentation locations,
called trigger points, related to different CFEs, where profiling
or monitoring code can be inserted. For basic blocks, functions,
and loops, these are on entry and exit to the CFE; for
instructions they are before and after. There are two special
blocks, init and exit blocks, which correspond to the
locations where any initialisation and finalisation code (i.e.,
code to be executed before or after any instructions belonging
to an application) can be added.
5) Analysis and Inspection Code: Before instrumenting
actions for a specific CFE, a programmer may need to define
or compute some data, to be used later in the action block,
by performing some analysis. In Cinnamon, this analysis code
can be placed before an action block and can be written as
C-style statements.
6) Constraints: Programmer-specified constraints on com-
mand blocks serve as a filtering criteria to avoid running the
analysis and instrumentation code where not needed, thus
reducing overhead. Based on the target framework and validity
of the requested information for filtering, these constraints can
be evaluated either statically or dynamically. The compiler
backend can check whether the information needed to evaluate
a constraint is available and valid at the required program point
for the target framework, and throw an error if not.
7) Ordering of Commands and Actions: If multiple com-
mands are present in a program, their code will be mapped (but
not necessarily executed) in the same order in the underlying
framework. Similarly, if multiple actions are listed for a CFE at
the same trigger point (for example, before a certain instruction),
they will be instrumented in the same order they occur in the
Cinnamon program.
When writing Cinnamon programs, developers need to pay
attention to when the analysis and instrumentation of actions
is performed and when the instrumented actions are actually
executed. The analysis and instrumentation stage is when the
Cinnamon-compiler generated code goes over different CFEs,
performs computation or analysis, and instruments the code
according to the action, init and exit blocks. Only the code
outside action, init and exit blocks is actually executed at this
stage. The execution stage is when the newly updated under-
observation binary is actually run, along with the instrumented
code of action, init and exit blocks.
Different commands may communicate with each other only
through global variables or files (via I/O). In addition, if a
command produces some data that is later required by another
command during the analysis and instrumentation stage, then
these commands will need to be listed in the order of producer
then consumer.
8) Types and Opcodes: Cinnamon supports a number of
primitive and composite types, as well as defining certain
special types suitable for binary instrumentation. The primitive
types include integers, chars, and booleans, whereas composite
types include dictionary or map structures and static and
dynamic arrays (or vectors). A special addr type can be used
to hold the pointer-sized address of a memory location or the
target address of a control-transfer instruction.
A number of storage abstractions are defined that represent
whether the operand of an instruction is a memory location
(mem), a register (reg), or an immediate value (const). The
keyword IsType accesses a compiler builtin that can be used
to check the storage type of an operand against one of these
abstractions. Cinnamon also defines a list of special keywords
that represent instruction opcodes, such as Call, Load, and
Branch. The present list of primitive and composite types and
opcodes is not fixed and can be easily extended for a new
architecture (and ISA).
9) Attributes of Control-Flow Elements: In order to perform
profiling and monitoring, a programmer may need to acquire
different attributes of a CFE, such as the target address of
a call instruction, operand address of a memory instruction,
or identifier (ID) of a loop. Accessing the values of these
attributes in the target framework is not always trivial and may
require writing complex low-level code. Cinnamon simplifies
the access to these attributes through the dot (.) operator, in
the same way as accessing fields of a struct in C.
C. Grammar
Figure 3 shows the partial grammar of Cinnamon in EBNF
form. The root of the syntax tree is the Cinnamon program,
which is composed of optional global variable declarations,
a set of command blocks, and initialisation and finalisation
blocks. We have omitted several productions rules as they can
be defined similarly as in standard programming languages,
such as C, e.g., 〈id〉 for C-style identifiers, 〈str_const〉 for string
literals, 〈init_expr〉 for initializer lists.
IV. CINNAMON IMPLEMENTATION
The workflow in figure 4 shows compilation and translation
of Cinnamon code to build a stand-alone profiling or monitoring
tool, and is composed of two stages.
The first stage involves the Cinnamon compiler, which
consists of a front-end for a Cinnamon program and a back-end
〈prog〉 |= 〈decl〉∗ (init { 〈stmt〉∗ })? 〈cmd〉∗ (exit { 〈stmt〉∗ })?
〈cmd〉 |= 〈e_type〉 〈id〉 〈cst〉? { (〈cmd〉 | 〈stmt〉 | 〈act〉)∗ }
〈cst〉 |= where (〈expr〉)
〈act〉 |= 〈trigger_point〉 〈id〉 〈cst〉? { 〈stmt〉∗ }
〈stmt〉 |= 〈expr〉; | 〈decl〉; | 〈lvalue〉 = 〈expr〉;
| if (〈expr〉) { 〈stmt〉∗ } (else { 〈stmt〉∗ })?
| for (〈decl〉?; 〈expr〉?; 〈stmt〉?) { 〈stmt〉∗ }
〈expr〉 |= 〈lvalue〉 IsType 〈op_type〉 | 〈expr〉 〈bin_op〉 〈expr〉 | 〈lvalue〉 | 〈rvalue〉
〈decl〉 |= 〈type-spec〉 〈id〉 (= 〈init_expr〉)?
〈lvalue〉 |= 〈id〉 | 〈lvalue〉[〈expr〉] | 〈lvalue〉.〈id〉
〈rvalue〉 |= 〈id〉(〈args〉?) | 〈str_const〉 | 〈bool_const〉 | 〈num〉 | 〈opcode〉 | 〈null_ptr〉
〈args〉 |= 〈expr〉 | 〈expr〉, 〈args〉
〈e_type〉 |= inst | basicblock | func | loop | module
〈opcode〉 |= Call | Mov | Load | Store | Branch | Return | Add | Sub | Mul | Div | GetPtr
〈op_type〉 |= mem | reg | const
〈trigger_point〉 |= before | after | entry | exit | iter
Figure 3: The partial grammar of Cinnamon.
or code generator for the target binary framework. The front-
end performs lexing and parsing of the code and generates
an abstract syntax tree (AST). The code generator processes
each AST node and emits C/C++ code that includes target-
framework-specific analysis passes, handler passes, which
perform instrumentation based on the constraints, and an
interface between analysis and handler passes. The front-end
of the compiler is independent of the target binary framework
and does not need to be changed if the Cinnamon compiler is
ported to a different framework.
The second stage of the workflow involves plugging the
code generated by the Cinnamon compiler into appropriate
places in the target framework through the use of template
files, containing boilerplate code, and pattern matching. The
combined code is then compiled using a standard compiler
(e.g., GCC and LLVM) to build the final tool.
A. Utility Libraries
Section III-B describes how attributes of a CFE can be
accessed in Cinnamon using a dot operator, removing the
need to write low-level, complex code to access them. To
achieve this we provide a number of get or accessor-like utility
routines that encapsulate the low-level code for each target
framework to extract the desired attributes and return the values
to the programmer. Since a CFE attribute then becomes just an
identifier in Cinnamon, it is simple for a programmer to modify
the compiler to extend the attribute list by implementing each
new accessor routine and thus create new attributes.
B. Interface between Static and Dynamic Contexts
The attributes of a control-flow element may belong to either
or both of its static and dynamic contexts. For example, the IDs
assigned to loops or functions statically, at the time of control-
flow reconstruction, are not part of their dynamic context.
However, during its execution, the instrumented code may
need to know the ID of a loop in order to associate profiling
data with it. Similarly, the analysis code may generate data
that needs to be consumed by the instrumentation code. For
such cases, any static attributes of a CFE, or data generated
by the analysis code, are passed to the instrumentation code
in a framework-dependent manner (for example, by encoding
them as arguments to call-back functions).
C. Integration with Binary Frameworks
We target Cinnamon to three different binary analysis and
instrumentation frameworks: Janus, Dyninst and Pin.
1) Integration with Janus: Janus is composed of a static
analyzer and a dynamic instrumenter. The static part includes
core libraries that construct the control-flow graph (CFG) of a
binary and provide an interface to analyse instructions, basic
blocks, functions, loops, and their attributes. Instructions or
basic blocks can be annotated with hints, called rewrite rules,
which are recorded separately and encode information about
a corresponding dynamic handler and any data to be passed
along. The dynamic part of Janus is based on DynamoRIO. It
dynamically translates the binary one basic block at a time and
allows inspection or modification of the constituent instructions
according to the rewrite rules before the block is executed for
the first time.
When targeting a Cinnamon program to Janus, the code
within a command is split between its static and dynamic parts.
The Cinnamon compiler emits code for the static analyzer that
traverses the list of CFEs based on the constraints specified by











































Figure 4: Cinnamon workflow.
adds boilerplate code for the static analyzer that encodes actions
and their trigger points in separate rewrite rules. Any data
produced by the static analyzer that is later consumed by an
action is also recorded in the rewrite rule.
The code emitted for each action is encapsulated in a separate
callback function. The Cinnamon compiler further generates
boilerplate code for the dynamic part, where instructions within
each basic block are checked for any associated rewrite rules.
If found, the rewrite rule is decoded to extract the trigger point
and the corresponding callback function for the action. The
callback function is then instrumented at the specified location
using DynamoRIO’s clean call facility. Any data produced by
the static analyzer is passed as one or more arguments to the
callback function.
2) Integration with Dyninst: Dyninst allows both static and
dynamic instrumentation of a binary. It builds the CFG of a
target binary through static analysis and offers control-flow
abstractions, such as functions, loops, and basic blocks, to the
programmer, as well as handles to different instrumentation
locations, such as the entry and exit of a loop. It uses a
trampoline-based approach to add instrumentation code, called
a snippet, to the binary.
We use Dyninst in its static analysis and rewriting mode
and implement a back-end for the Cinnamon compiler to
generate the code accordingly. Similarly to Janus, code is
emitted for each command to iterate over the list of control-
flow elements and execute analysis code. Actions are also
encapsulated similarly in callback functions and the Cinnamon
compiler emits code that uses Dyninst APIs to determine the
location of the specified instrumentation point in the binary.
The action code is instrumented as snippets and any static
analysis data can be directly passed to callback functions as
one or more arguments.
3) Integration with Pin: Pin performs dynamic binary
instrumentation using a just-in-time compilation approach,
where code is instrumented on-the-fly just before it is executed.
There are four main instrumentation modes in Pin that allow
inspection and instrumentation of a binary at different granular-
ity levels (i.e., instruction, trace, routine and image). Routine
and image modes work ahead-of-time and need symbolic
information; information about loops is not available in Pin.
Similarly to Janus and Dyninst, the Cinnamon compiler
encapsulates actions in callback functions. The code to insert
calls to these functions in Pin is enclosed inside instrumentation
callback routines that operate in one of the four instrumentation
modes based on the granularity specified by the programmer.
As such, instrumentation code can be inserted before or after
an instruction and at the entry and exit of a function or basic
block. All necessary boilerplate code and conversion of data
to be passed as arguments to callback functions is generated
by the Cinnamon compiler.
D. Summary
We have presented Cinnamon, a domain-specific language
for binary profiling and monitoring, with a compiler that
targets three instrumentation frameworks. We now describe use
cases for our language, before evaluating its usefulness as an
abstraction tool.
V. CASE STUDIES
We present a number of profiling and monitoring codes as
case studies to demonstrate the breadth of applications that
can be built with Cinnamon.
A. Profiling Tools
1) Instruction Counting: Instruction counting is a simple and
common profiling application. We demonstrate two different
ways to implement it in Cinnamon.
The code listed in figure 5a is a basic way to count the
number of load instructions in a program. The command on
lines 2–6 selects all load instructions and applies an action to
increment a global counter inst_count before each of those
instructions executes. The final value of the counter is printed
to standard output on program exit (lines 7–9).
In contrast, the code shown in figure 5b implements a
lower overhead version of instruction counting. It keeps a
local counter of load instructions for each basic block (lines
3–6) and defines an action to add the local counter to a global
counter before each block executes (line 7–9). This results in
1 uint64 inst_count = 0;
2 inst I where (I.opcode == Load) {
3 before I {







1 uint64 inst_count = 0;
2 basicblock B {
3 uint64 local_inst_count = 0;
4 inst I where (I.opcode == Load) {
5 local_inst_count = local_inst_count + 1;
6 }
7 before B where (local_inst_count > 0) {






(b) Lower overhead, demonstrating nested commands
Figure 5: Two implementations of instruction counting.
action code being instrumented and executed once per basic
block instead of once per load instruction and the overhead is
thus reduced compared to the first code. The nested command
on lines 4–6 is within the scope of the basic block defined
by the outer command and contains no action code, hence the
statement on line 5 is part of the analysis phase only. Thus,
the computation of local_inst_count is complete before the
action on lines 7–9 is instrumented for basic block B.
The Cinnamon compiler encapsulates the code within action
blocks at figure 5a, line 4 and figure 5b, line 8 in callback
functions. For Janus, the compiler emits code to dynamically
insert clean calls to these functions whereas the rest of the
code is mapped to the static analyzer. Both the analysis and
instrumentation of actions is done statically for Dyninst and
dynamically for Pin.
2) Loop-Coverage Profiling: Loop-coverage profiling is an
important tool that can be used to identify hot loops, which
are potential targets for optimization, such as parallelization.
Figure 6 shows the code for a loop-coverage profiler in
Cinnamon. At the entry block of each loop, during its execution,
the loop is marked as an active or living loop (lines 10–12)
and set back to inactive at the exit block of the loop (lines
13–15). Next, at the entry to each basic block, a global counter
of executed blocks is incremented and local counter of each
active loop is also incremented (lines 23–31) to record that this
basic block has been executed. At program exit, the coverage
of each loop is calculated as a percentage of the total number
of basic blocks executed in the program (lines 31–36).
B. Monitoring Tools
1) Use-After-Free Vulnerability Monitoring: Use-after-free
vulnerabilities occur when a programmer frees memory (in a
language without garbage collection) but holds on to a pointer
1 uint64 global_bbs_exec = 0;
2 int next_global_id = 0;
3 dict<int, int> loop_bbs_exec;
4 dict<int, int> living_loop;
5 int num_loops = 0;
6
7 loop L {
8 int loop_id = next_global_id;
9 next_global_id = next_global_id + 1;
10 entry L {
11 living_loop[loop_id] = 1; // loop becomes alive
12 }
13 exit L {
14 living_loop[loop_id] = 0; // loop no longer alive
15 }
16 }
17 module M {
18 num_loops = num_loops + M.numLoops;
19 basicblock B {
20 entry B {
21 global_bbs_exec = global_bbs_exec + 1;
22 for (int i=0; i<num_loops; i=i+1) {
23 if (living_loop[i] == 1) {
24 // update loop count for all alive loops







32 for (int i=0; i<num_loops; i=i+1) {









5 inst I where (I.opcode == Call && I.trgname == "malloc") {
6 before I {
7 size = I.arg1; // size of malloc allocation
8 }
9 after I {
10 addr base_addr = I.rtnval; // base address of allocation
11 for (addr i=base_addr; i<base_addr+size; i=i+1) {
12 base_table[i] = base_addr;
13 }
14 freed[base_addr] = 0;
15 }
16 }
17 inst I where (I.opcode == Call && I.trgname == "free") {
18 before I {
19 addr ptr_addr = I.arg1; // address to be freed
20 freed[ptr_addr] = 1;
21 }
22 }
23 inst I where (I.opcode == Load || I.opcode == Store) {
24 before I {
25 addr acc_addr = I.memaddr; // address being read/written
26 addr base_addr;
27 if (base_table[acc_addr] != NULL ) {
28 base_addr = base_table[acc_addr];






Figure 7: Use-after-free vulnerability monitoring.
to that memory that is later reused. They can be exploited
by attackers by reallocating the memory to themselves and
leveraging the reuse to take over the program.
Figure 7 shows code written in Cinnamon that monitors and
intercepts the occurrence of use-after-free accesses [47]. The
command on lines 5–18 selects call instructions to the malloc
function. For each such instruction, it records the size, which
is the first argument of the malloc call, and the base address
of the allocation, which is the value returned by the malloc
call (line 6–15), and marks as allocated addresses in the range
<base_addr, base_addr+size>. The second command (lines
17–22) selects all call instructions to free and defines the
action to mark the input addresses as freed.
The last command (lines 23–35) selects all load and store
instructions and checks whether they represent a use-after-free
access, i.e., the address being read or written having initially
been allocated by a malloc call and later freed.
2) Control-Flow Integrity—Shadow Stack: Shadow stack is
a defense mechanism used to implement control-flow integrity
on backward edges (i.e., function returns) [48]. An attacker
can divert the execution of the program to malicious code
by changing the contents of the function stack, including the
return address, through a buffer-overflow attack.
Figure 8 shows Cinnamon code that implements the stricter
form of backward CFI, allowing a callee to return only to its
most recent caller. For each call instruction, we record the
address it should return to on a shadow stack (lines 4–10).
Next, we specify code for all return instructions that checks
the return address before each is executed and ensures that it
matches the address on top of shadow stack (lines 11–19).
3) Control-Flow Integrity—Forward Edge: Control-flow
integrity is also used to protect forward edges, i.e., function
calls and branches. Direct function calls and branches are not
an issue, since their target is part of the code memory and
hence not writeable. However, the targets of indirect calls and
branches are calculated from the contents of data memory,
which can be written to and corrupted.
Figure 9 shows our implementation of forward CFI, which
allows any valid function to be the target of a call. We first
record the start address of each function (lines 4–6) in a file.
These values are read by initialization code in a vector vtable
(lines 14–17). The command on lines 7–13 specifies an action
before each call instruction that checks whether the target
address is one of the valid function addresses (i.e., found in
the vectorvtable).
VI. DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
Cinnamon’s value can be considered based on a number of
factors, such as whether it is expressive enough to implement
different binary profiling techniques, the length of code to write
a certain technique, its portability to different frameworks and
platforms, as well as its performance. We discuss these factors
along with any limitations.
A. Expressiveness
The abstractions for control-flow elements and instru-
mentation locations defined by Cinnamon allow flexibility to
1 dict<int,addr> sstack;
2 int top = 0;
3
4 inst I where (I.opcode == Call) {
5 before I {
6 addr fall_addr = I.nextaddr; // return address of call
7 sstack[top] = fall_addr;
8 top = top + 1;
9 }
10 }
11 inst I where (I.opcode == Return) {
12 before I {
13 if (top > 0 && sstack[top-1] == I.trgaddr) {










4 func F {
5 writeToFile(outfile, F.startAddr);
6 }
7 inst I where (I.opcode == Call) {
8 before I {






15 for(line l = outfile.getline(); l!=NULL; )
16 vtable.add(l);
17 }
Figure 9: Forward control-flow integrity.
insert code at different granularities and enable the implement-
ation of a wide range of profiling and monitoring techniques.
Instruction counting and loop-coverage profiling use cases
demonstrate the flexibility of Cinnamon to perform profiling
at both fine- and coarse-grained levels.
The field dot operator notation, such as I.opcode, facilitates
a uniform interface to access different attributes of a CFE in
both static and dynamic domains. Any new fields or attributes
related to a CFE can be supported by implementing the
corresponding accessor function.
The analysis code and actions can be represented in C-style
along with a number of supported data structures and I/O
operations. This makes the analysis and instrumentation code
very expressive and enables complex profiling and monitoring
techniques to be applied.
B. Code Length and Complexity
In order to build a custom profiling or monitoring tool
using existing binary frameworks, programmers have to write
framework-specific code for set-up or tear-down, insertion of
callbacks, and access to attributes. In Cinnamon, we shift the
burden of adding this code from the developer to Cinnamon’s
back-end. This reduces the number of lines of code that a
programmer has to write, as well as the complexity of the
TABLE I: COMPARISON OF CODE LENGTHS.
Use case Cinnamon Dyninst Janus Pin
Inst count 10 215 90 23
Loop coverage 40 229 150 -
Use-after-free 39 260 193 57
Shadow stack 20 196 136 38
Forward CFI 17 207 103 50
code, and helps the programmer to focus on implementing
their specific profiling or monitoring technique and not worry
about lower-level framework details. Any boilerplate code needs
to be written only once by the back-end developer.
Table I shows a comparison of the number of lines of code
written for the use cases from section V when implemented in
Cinnamon versus directly in Dyninst, Janus and Pin. Dyninst,
in particular, requires verbose code, but Cinnamon still needs
almost an order of magnitude less code than Janus. Note also
that writing a Cinnamon program just once allows it to be
targeted to any of these three frameworks without modification,
instead of having to develop separate versions for each tool, as
explained next. The only exception here is the loop coverage
example which could not be translated to Pin in its original form
as Pin does not have a notion of loops. However, integrating
loop detection techniques [49] in Pin could make it transparent
to the programmer.
C. Portability
Cinnamon captures the abstractions, types, and code patterns
that are specific to binary instrumentation but are independent of
the underlying framework being used. Hence, the programmer
can port or re-target their code to a different framework just
by using its respective back-end and without having to rewrite
the code.
Figure 10 shows a comparison of code in Dyninst and Janus
to access the return value of a function call, using x86 calling
conventions, and pass it to an instrumented callback function
on_call. Similarly, figure 11 shows the code to access a
store’s memory address and pass it to an instrumented callback
function on_store. In Cinnamon, the value of these parameters
can be accessed simply by using I.rtnval and I.dstaddr
notations respectively; the corresponding code is hidden behind
and enclosed in utility library routines.
Figure 12 presents a comparison of the number of in-
structions in SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks as reported by
Cinnamon’s instruction-counting program, targeted to the
frameworks we have described. As can be seen, instruction
counts are consistent between these back-ends, despite using
exactly the same Cinnamon program. Pin, however, reports a
significantly higher count for omnetpp, exchange, bwaves and
fotoni3d as it performs dynamic instrumentation and hence
is able to discover more instructions than Janus and Dyninst
(i.e., it counts instructions within dynamically linked libraries).
Unfortunately, several benchmarks would not work correctly
with Dyninst, either when targeted by Cinnamon’s compiler,
1 /*----- callback function ----*/
2 void on_call(uint64_t rtn_val){
3 printf("return␣value:␣%ld\n", rtn_val);
4 }




9 BPatch_funcCallExpr instrFuncExpr(*on_call, instArgs);
10 BPatchSnippetHandle *handle = app->insertSnippet(instrFuncExpr,
11 *instr, BPatch_callAfter);
(a) Dyninst
1 /*----- callback function ----*/
2 void on_call(uint64_t rtn_val){
3 printf("return␣value:␣%ld\n", rtn_val);
4 }
5 /*- code to access return value & add instrumentation -*/
6 dr_insert_clean_call(drcontext, bb, instr, (void*)on_call,
7 false, opnd_create_reg(DR_REG_RAX));
(b) Janus
Figure 10: Code to access the return value of a call instruction instr in
Dyninst and Janus.
1 /*----- callback function ----*/
2 void on_store(intptr_t dst_addr){
3 printf("dest␣addr:␣%p\n", dst_addr);
4 }
5 /*- access destination memory address & add instrumentation -*/
6 BPatch_effectiveAddressExpr dst_addr;
7 BPatch_Vector< BPatch_snippet*> instArgs;
8 instArgs.push_back(&dst_addr);
9 BPatch_funcCallExpr instrFuncExpr(*on_store, instArgs);
10 BPatchSnippetHandle *handle = app->insertSnippet(instrFuncExpr,
11 *instr, BPatch_callBefore);
(a) Dyninst
1 /*----- callback function ----*/




6 dr_mcontext_t mc = {sizeof(mc), DR_MC_ALL};




11 if(decode(drcontext, st_instr, &decoded_instr) != NULL){
12 num_dsts = instr_num_dsts(&decoded_instr);
13 for(int i=0; i<num_dsts; i++){
14 opnd_t mem_opnd = instr_get_dst(&decoded_instr,i);





20 /*- add instrumentation -*/
21 app_pc src_instr = instr_get_app_pc(instr);
22 dr_insert_clean_call(drcontext, bb, instr, (void*)on_store,
23 false, 1, OPND_CREATE_INTPTR(src_instr));
(b) Janus
Figure 11: Code to access the memory address being written by a store
instruction instr in Dyninst and Janus.
or when writing code directly for that framework due to





















































Figure 12: Number of load instructions in SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks (test
input) as reported by Cinnamon back-ends.
D. Performance
The performance of the final under-observation binary is
dependent on the instrumentation code that is added by the
developer in their Cinnamon program and not as a result of
overheads that Cinnamon’s compiler introduces. However, we
encapsulate the action code in callback routines and use clean
calls in DynamoRIO and Pin, and function-call snippets in
Dyninst to execute them. Due to context switches, callback
routines may have a higher overhead than inserting the action
code directly into the binary using low-level instructions.
However, the underlying binary framework may still inline
the clean call (as DynamoRIO does) if the code within the
callback function is simple enough (i.e., it does not involve
calls to other functions).
To demonstrate the overheads we experienced for the tools
developed in this paper, we compared execution times of
profiling tools we wrote ourselves directly in each framework
and the tools developed with Cinnamon across SPEC CPU
2017 benchmarks. Figure 13 shows the overhead for the
instruction counting tool from figure 5b, one of the simplest
realistic tools that could be developed and therefore not reliant
on the skill of the programmer to write (either natively or
in Cinnamon). Cinnamon’s overheads are highest for Pin
(average 4.75%), then Janus (average 1.88%) and finally
Dyninst (average 0.67%), although the latter does not work
for all benchmarks, as previously described. Overheads are
negligible for many benchmarks and all under 4% for Janus
and Dyninst. Considering Pin only, with the highest overheads,
other tools are similar—use-after-free monitoring (figure 7)
has 0.52% overhead on average and 1.78% maximum, whereas
forward CFI (figure 9) has 3.06% overhead on average and
11% maximum.
E. Limitations
The control-flow abstractions provided by Cinnamon essen-
tially rely upon the support of corresponding features provided
by underlying target frameworks. For example, Pin does not
have the notion of loops thus the granularity levels at which
code can be inserted will be limited. Similarly, access to various
attributes of a CFE depend on whether the corresponding

























































Figure 13: Cinnamon overhead (%) for instruction counting (figure 5b) across
SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks compared to implementation of the same profiling
tool natively in the underlying framework.
words, some dynamic attributes may not be available for purely
static techniques and vice versa. Currently, we only provide
accessor routines for the attributes, which means they cannot
be modified. This is sufficient for our purposes as Cinnamon
programs are meant for performing only passive monitoring. In
the future, Cinnamon could be extended with modifier routines
to allow more transformations.
Further, Cinnamon does not support interrupt routines, such
as those based on timers. Therefore, timer-based sampling
techniques, which may have lower runtime overhead than
sampling every instruction or basic block, cannot be im-
plemented currently. Cinnamon does not currently contain
thread-related primitives, but can instrument multi-threaded
applications if the analysis does not require synchronization.
VII. RELATED WORK
In recent years, there has been a significant interest in the
development of domain-specific languages for analysis and
optimization at source code [50], [51], compiler [52]–[55], and
binary [56]–[59] levels.
CanDL [52] is a constraint-based DSL to write compiler-
analysis code that operates over LLVM’s IR. Users provide
analysis specifications through constraints that are translated
down to an LLVM analysis pass; transformations must be
written separately in C++. CanDL can be used for both peephole
and more complex analysis algorithms with fewer lines of
code when compared to LLVM. However, the specification
for CanDL comprises of a large number of varied and non-
uniform constructs and constraints that users need to familiarize
themselves with before being able to write any analysis code.
In contrast, Alive [53] allows peephole optimizations through
specification of pattern or code sequences in the LLVM IR
that can be replaced with more optimized sequences. The ER-
ESI [60] project on reverse engineering of binaries introduces
a RISC-like intermediate representation langauge called ELIR
to facilitate binary analysis, along with a domain-specific meta
langauge [61] to write analysis routines that operate on this
representation. REIL [62] is another intermediate-representation
language developed to allow writing analysis routines in a
platform-independent manner and has been used as the base
representation in other binary-analysis frameworks [63].
MDL [59] is a DSL that facilitates collection of performance
data through dynamic binary instrumentation at function entry,
exit, and call points but is limited to collecting performance
metrics through counters and timers. In contrast, DiSL [57]
is a bytecode instrumentation language embedded in Java to
support dynamic program analysis by inserting code snippets
in the form of Java classes. Mussler et al. [58] propose
an instrumentation DSL built on top of Dyninst that uses
the static structural information to filter the instrumentation
locations in the code and reduce the measurement overhead.
The instrumentation code snippet and filters can be configured
through adapter specifications, an XML file, and user filters,
but it is not clear how these interact. Moreover, the filtering
criteria have been defined only in the context of functions.
It is not clear if and how these criteria can be extended or
customized and whether they can be applied to other code
structures, such as loops and call sites.
There has also been some work in performance-oriented
languages that focuses on specifying algorithmic skeletons
or code patterns that can be used to find their most efficient
and optimized implementations. Lift [64] specifies high-level
algorithmic expressions that can be translated down to OpenCL
implementations for different platforms. The Idiom Description
Language (IDL) [54] describes idioms or patterns in programs
so that legacy sequential codes can be optimized and targeted
to use different optimized APIs and DSLs for linear algebra
libraries, such as BLAS and stencil computation. Halide [65] is
a DSL for writing image-processing pipelines that separates the
concern of specifying computation and how the computation is
performed (i.e., through tiling, vectorization, or parallelization).
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Building binary profiling and monitoring tools from scratch
or using existing binary frameworks can be a very tedious
and time-consuming task. Cinnamon enables a flexible and
framework-independent way of building such tools that allows
the developer to focus on implementing a specific profiling
and monitoring approach. We demonstrate, through different
use-cases, that Cinnamon can be used to express a variety of
profiling and monitoring techniques and can be ported across
frameworks without having to re-write the code.
Cinnamon allows analysis or instrumentation to be performed
on a binary without altering the original application code.
Future work will investigage how Cinnamon can be extended
to support optimization, ranging from peephole transformations
to parallelization.
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